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INTRODUCTION TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT PLANS

The tax subsidy for employer-provided pensions and other tax-favored retirement savings is the largest subsidy flowing to individuals,
dwarfing even the tax revenue lost by the home mortgage deduction.'
The tax treatment of these retirement savings arrangements has in
recent years become extraordinarily complex, due in large part to
Congressional attempts to control and better target the subsidy to

*Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.S. 1968, Antioch College; M.S. 1972,
Stanford University; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School.
1. See Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement Security and Tax Policies, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 851, 874-75 (1987).
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serve its retirement security goals. The Tax Reform Act of 19862
added to this complexity by including two new taxes on these tax-favored retirement savings arrangements: a fifteen percent excise tax
on excess distributions, and a fifteen percent additional estate tax on
excess retirement accumulations.3
Although Congress has defined the concept of "excess" in a fashion
that undoubtedly relieves most plan participants from any tax liability,
the tax can be considerable for those who accumulate substantial
amounts of tax-favored retirement savings. These new taxes will therefore generate significant planning burdens for some individuals. These
involve not only determinations as to the timing and amount of distributions of benefits, but also the consideration whether new plans
should be established or contributions to existing plans continued.
This article first examines the legislative background of the taxes
and explores their structure, focusing on some of the more serious
technical problems. A number of these problems, including even the
misnumbering of the code section imposing the taxes, would be corrected by the proposed Technical Corrections Bill. 4 The Internal Revenue Service has also issued temporary regulations relating to the
new taxes that anticipate many of the proposed technical corrections.5

2. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
3. I.R.C. § 4981A (West Supp. 1987). Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent citations to
the I.R.C. refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
4. Identical Technical Corrections Bills were introduced in both the House and the Senate
on June 10, 1987. STAFF OF JOINT COMM.ON TAXATION, 100th CONG., 1st SESS., DESCRIPTION OF TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF 1987 (H.R. 2636 and S. 1350), at XIV (Joint
Comm. Print. 1987), (1987) Fed. Taxes (P-H) 59,035, at XIV [hereinafter DESCRIPTION OF
ACT]. The bills were later modified and attached to the Budget Reconciliation Bills. The portions
of the two versions of the Bill dealing with § 4981A remained identical except for a provision
in the House version providing a far more generous grandfather rule. Id. at 135-36. The technical
corrections provisions were dropped from the Budget Reconciliation Bill by the House-Senate
conferees and will be considered again in the Congressional session beginning in 1988. For
purposes of discussing the Technical Corrections Bill, citations will be to the version contained
in § 10211A(g) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Bill, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); (1987) Fed. Taxes (P-H) 59,035 (as passed by the House on Oct. 29, 1987) [hereinafter
Technical Corrections Bill].
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 placed the new taxes in a 'new" § 4981 at the end of chapter
43. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1133(a), 100 Stat. 2481. Unfortunately there was an existing § 4981,
dealing with the excise tax on undistributed income of real estate investment trusts, in chapter
44, which was not repealed. The compilers of unofficial codes have responded by placing the
new taxes in § 4981A of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 4981A (West Supp.
1987). The Technical Corrections Bill would redesignate the section as I.R.C. § 4980A. Technical
Corrections Bill § 10211A(g)(1)(A).
5. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, T.D. 8165, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,747 (1987).
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However, significant problems would remain and this article suggests
solutions where they are feasible. The article then examines the more
basic flaws inherent in the entire approach of the new taxes toward
controlling abuses of the tax subsidy.
Until the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 no statute limited either the annual contribution
an employer could make on behalf of a participant in a defined contribution plan or the annual benefit that could be paid to a participant in
a defined benefit plan. 7 To prevent the use of tax benefits to subsidize
the financing of excessively large retirement benefits, 8 ERISA limited
benefits and contributions under qualified plans. Currently, for defined
contribution plans, annual additions with respect to a participant are
limited to the lesser of $30,0009 or twenty-five percent of the participant's compensation. 10 For defined benefit plans, the annual benefit
with respect to a participant may not exceed the lesser of $90,000
(indexed for inflation) or one hundred percent of the average of the
participant's highest three years of compensation.", In addition, there
is a complex overall limitation on benefits and contributions when an
employer maintains both defined contribution and defined benefit
plans.12
Defects in the operation of these limitations undermine their effectiveness in controlling the tax subsidy for retirement savings. Probably
the most significant weakness is that they apply only to contributions
and benefits provided by a single employer. An individual with multiple
employers, either simultaneously or serially, could receive contributions and benefits far in excess of the existing limits. Similarly, the
limits fail to take account of other tax-favored retirement plans such
as individual retirement accounts.

6.

Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2004(a)(2); 88 Stat. 829, 979 (1974) (codified as amended in I.R.C.

§ 415).
7. The only limitation was on total contributions to stock bonus and profit-sharing plans.
The employer could not deduct any amount in excess of 15% of the total compensation paid or
accrued to all plan participants during the taxable year. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3).

8.

See H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1974).

of the dollar limitation in effect under I.R.C.
9. The $30,000 amount will be increased to
§ 415(b)(1)(A) when that limitation (currently $90,000) exceeds $120,000 by reason of inflation

adjustments. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1)(A).
10. I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (West 1983), amended by I.R.C. § 415(c)(1) (West 1987). In applying
this limit, all defined contribution plans are treated as one defined contribution plan. I.R.C. §

415(f)(1)(B).
11. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (West 1983). In applying this limit all defined benefit plans are treated
as one defined benefit plan. I.R.C. § 415(f)(1)(A).

12.

I.R.C. § 415(e).
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These defects were partly responsible for the Treasury Department's 1984 proposal for an excise tax on excess retirement distributions. 13 The Treasury also saw the excise tax as a way to justify repeal
of the overall limit, which prevents an employer from exploiting the
maximum contribution and benefit limits by setting up both a defined
benefit and a defined contribution plan. 14 The Treasury viewed the
calculation of the overall limit as imposing a significant burden on
employers and even made the astonishing suggestion, given the generally high level of complexity throughout Subchapter D, that the
calculation 'may be the primary source of complexity in the retirement
plan area."'' 5
The Treasury was also concerned that the overall limit creates a
disincentive for employers to establish both defined contribution and
defined benefit plans. 6 Younger employees tend to benefit more from
defined contribution plans, especially if they anticipate changing employers. Older employees, especially those nearing retirement, generally obtain greater benefits from a defined benefit plan.'1 The overall
limit makes it difficult for employers to provide maximum benefits to
both groups.
In addition to criticism of the overall limit and the lack of coordination with other plans, the Treasury claimed the limits on defined
contribution plans did not restrict the "tax-favored" benefits, but instead restricted only the contributions.8 The Treasury seemed to be
concerned that an individual could accumulate an unlimited amount of
benefits through a defined contribution plan such as a stock bonus or
profit-sharing plan, despite the fact that contributions were subject
to the annual $30,000 or twenty-five percent of compensation limita-

13.

TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY,

AND ECONOMIC GROWTH -

GENERAL

EXPLANATION OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS 328-32 (1984) [hereinafter
TREASURY REPORT].

14. Despite the operation of the overall limit of § 415(e), an employer can still, by using
both a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan, provide a greater total value of retirement
benefit than it could provide under either type of plan alone. For example, a participant in a
defined contribution plan who had received the maximum permissible contribution during each
year of service could also participate in a defined benefit plan and be eligible for a benefit equal
to between 25% and 40% of the maximum permissible benefit. See generally Stanger, Church,
& Johnson, Tax-Qualified Retirement Plans after TEFRA: Limitations on Benefits and Contributions and Top-Heavy Plan Rules, 41 INST. ON FED. TAx'N § 37.05, at 37-23 (1983).
15. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 329.
16. Id. at 330.
17. This would be particularly true for plans that based retirement benefits on a percentage
of final salary or an average of several high salary years.
18. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 13, at 330.
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tion. While it is true that a limitation on contributions leaves benefits
unchecked, dependent only on the success of the underlying investments, this is not necessarily a defect. No simple relationship exists
between the assets accumulated in a defined contribution plan and the
tax benefits that have been received in connection with the plan. This
issue is discussed more fully in part V of the article.
The Treasury proposed a two-fold approach to solve these perceived
problems with the limitations. 19 First, the overall limit would be repealed. 20 Second, an additional ten percent tax would be applied to
annual taxable distributions from all tax-favored retirement plans in
excess of 1.25 times the defined benefit dollar amount in effect for
the year. In the Treasury's view, 'the tax would recapture a portion
of the tax benefits provided to the excess distributions."'2' Because it
applied at the individual level, the Treasury argued that it would do
so in a fashion that avoided "significant employer involvement or administrative burden." 22
The President forwarded the Treasury's proposals to Congress
essentially unchanged.2 3 The House bill rejected repeal of the overall
limitation, 24 thereby abandoning the Treasury's goal of simplification.
The House, however, shared the Treasury's concerns regarding the
application of the contribution and benefit limits to multiple employers
and IRA accounts. 25 Concluding that the limits "were adopted to limit
the total amount that could be accumulated on behalf of a participant
on a tax-favored basis,"2 the House accepted the concept of an excise
tax to deal with the problem of accumulations of multiple benefits
from various employers and types of plans.
Apart from increasing the tax rate to fifteen percent, the House
bill contained two significant provisions that were not part of the
original proposal. First, it provided special treatment for lump sum
distributions. 27 Second, in lieu of subjecting post-death distributions
to the annual excise tax, it added an additional estate tax equal to
fifteen percent of excess retirement accumulations.2 Although the Sen-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
§ 14.04
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 330-31.
The overall limit would continue to apply to top-heavy plans. Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity,
at 355-59 (May 29, 1985).
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 745 (1985) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 747.
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ate bill did not contain an excise tax, the Conference Committee basically adopted the House's proposal, albeit with some minor modifications and the addition of a transitional rule. 29
II.

EXCISE TAX ON EXCESS DISTRIBUTIONS

A. Description
Section 4981A(a) imposes a fifteen percent excise tax on excess
distributions from all pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, and annuity
plans, as well as from all individual retirement accounts and annuities
(IRAs) and tax sheltered annuities. Excess distributions are defined
as the aggregate amount of all such distributions with respect to any
individual during any calendar year that exceeds the greater of (1)
$150,000 or (2) $112,500 (indexed for inflation in the same manner as
the maximum limitation on annual benefits under a defined benefit
pension plan).30 The tax is imposed on the individual for whom the
excess distributions are made.3' The tax is reduced by the amount (if
any) of the ten percent tax imposed on early distributionss "to the
extent attributable to such excess distributions."'
29. H.R. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-477-78 (1986) [hereinafter CONFERENCE
REPORT].

30. I.R.C. §§ 4981A(c)(1), (c)(5)(C). See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, a-2 (1987). The
current wording of the statute is somewhat confusing. Section 4981A(c)(1) defines "excess distribution" only in terms of the $112,500 (indexed) amount. However, § 4981A(c)(5)(C) provides
that if an employee does not elect the special transitional rule, then the definition of excess
distribution is based on the greater of (1) $112,500 (indexed) or (2) $150,000. Thus the transitional
rule in effect overrides the general definition of excess distribution. The Technical Corrections
Bill would reword the definition to make the general rule more clear. Technical Corrections
Bill, § 10211A(g)(2).
31. I.R.C. § 4981A(b).
32. Id. § 72(t).
33. Id. § 4981A(b). The statute does not specify exactly how this computation is to be
made. There are at least three possible approaches, and the legislative history is unclear on
the matter. As an illustration, assume that in 1988 an individual receives $40,000 in pension
payments not subject to the 10% § 72(t) tax and withdraws $160,000 from an IRA that is subject
to a § 72(t) tax of $16,000 (10% of $160,000). The amount of the excess distribution is $50,000
($40,000 + $160,000 - $150,000) and the excise tax is $7,500 (15% of $50,000). The question is
how much of the 10% tax can be credited against the excise tax. Under an interpretation most
favorable to the taxpayer, one could treat the IRA distribution as being made last and thus all
$50,000 of the excess distribution would be attributable to the IRA. Under this approach $5,000
of the 10% additional tax could be credited against the excise tax.
The Service has adopted the opposite approach. Under the temporary regulations,
[flor purposes of determining the extent to which the 10 percent tax is applied to
excess distributions, the only amounts subject to the 10 percent tax that are taken
into account are distributions in excess of $150,000 (or if greater, the $112,500
(indexed) threshold for the year).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss5/1
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B. Exclusions
Certain types of distributions are excluded from the excise tax.
Congress made a basic structural decision to exclude post-death distributions-A They are subject instead to an additional fifteen percent
estate tax, discussed more fully in part III of this article.
The other exclusions largely parallel equivalent exclusions from
normal income taxation. Thus, distributions excluded from gross income because they are rolled over into another qualified plan or IRA
are also excluded from the excise tax.3 The Technical Corrections Bill
would also exclude the distribution of an annuity contract that is
excluded from gross income when the contract is distributed.3 These
exclusions are sensible because neither rollovers nor annuity contracts
are treated as true distributions of retirement savings for normal
estate tax purposes, but rather merely as a shift of the investment
vehicle. Taxation is postponed until payments are actually made.
Distributions attributable to after-tax contributions, but not the
earnings, are excluded for excise tax purposes as they are excluded
from gross income. This exclusion is consistent with the stated purpose
of the excise tax, which is to recapture a portion of the tax benefit
attributable to excessive tax deferral. Since an individual's after-tax
contribution to a retirement plan is by its very nature not a tax
deferred contribution, its return is rightfully not subject to the excise
tax. Similarly, the Technical Corrections Bill would exclude from the
excise tax various corrective distributions representing a return of
excess contributions, excess deferrals3 that have not produced any
tax benefits and thus should not be subject to the excise tax.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, c-4(b) (1987). In the example only $10,000 of the $160,000
subject to the 10% tax is in excess of $150,000, and thus under the Service's approach only
$1,000 (10% of $10,000) of the 10% tax can be credited against the § 4981A excise tax.
A third possible approach would be to assume that the excess distribution comes proportionately from all of the sources of the distribution. In the example, since the excess distribution
is 25% of the total distribution, one could plausibly argue that 25% of the early IRA distribution
is attributable to this excess and that $4,000 (25% of $16,000) of the early distribution tax can
therefore be credited against the excise tax.
34. I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(2)(A).
35. Id. § 4981A(c)(2)(D).
36. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(3)(B). The temporary regulations anticipate this
technical correction. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, a-5 (1987).
37. I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(2)(C). Currently this exclusion only applies to an "employee's" investment in the contract, but the Technical Corrections Bill would clariIy that the exclusion applies
to an "individual's" investment in the contract and thus includes, for example, nondeductible
contributions to an IRA. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(3)(A). The temporary regulations anticipate this technical correction. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, a-4(a)(3) (1987).
38. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(3)(B). The temporary regulations anticipate this
technical correction. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, a-7 (1987).
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It should be emphasized, however, that the parallel with the normal
income tax is not complete. There is no general excise tax exclusion
for all amounts not includable in gross income. For example, there is
no excise tax exclusion for the net unrealized appreciation in employer
securities, 39 even though such appreciation is excludable from gross
income if the securities are distributed in the form of a lump sum
distribution. 40 The reason for the differing treatment is probably administrative. Postponing application of the excise tax to the unrealized
appreciation until the stock were sold would present difficult tracing"
and allocation 42 problems.
The temporary regulations provide an additional exclusion for
health coverage or distributions of medical benefits provided under
an arrangement described in section 401(h), 43 which is excludable from
income under sections 104 (compensation for injuries or sickness), 105
(amounts received under accident and health plans), or 106 (employer
contributions to accident and health plans). 44 This exclusion is not in
the statute or even in the Technical Corrections Bill. Although such
benefits for retired employees are certainly a form of deferred compensation, it is unlikely that Congress had them in mind when the excise
tax was enacted.
Finally, there is an excise tax exclusion for distributions payable
to an alternate payee under a qualified domestic relations order
(QDRO) if includable in the alternate payee's income. 45 This limits the
exclusion to distributions to spouses and former spouses, since as to
other alternate payees, children, or other dependents of the participant, the participant must include the distribution in gross income.6
39.
40.
41.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-lT, a-8 (1987).
I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)j).
Tracing problems would occur, for example, if the shares were commingled with other

shares. Auditing would also prove troublesome because there would be no easy way for the
Service to determine whether the sale of shares was subject to the excise tax.

42. Presumably only the unrealized appreciation at the time of the distribution, and not
any future appreciation, would be subject to the excise tax.
43. Generally a pension plan may not provide benefits for sickness, accident, hospitalization,
or medical expenses. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i). Section 401(h) permits an exception to this

rule if the plan meets certain requirements. Such benefits must be subordinate to the retirement
benefits, maintained in a separate account, contributions to the account must be reasonable and

ascertainable, the account cannot be used for any purpose other than providing such benefits,
and amounts remaining in the account after all liabilities for such benefits are satisfied must be
returned to the employer. I.R.C. § 401(h)(1) to (5).
44. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, a-4(a)(5) (1987).
45. I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(2)(B).
46. Id. § 402(a)(9). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 756 (Joint Comm.
Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION] ("Distributions paid to other alternate payees
(e.g., minor children) are includible in applying the limit.").
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Such distributions are treated for excise tax purposes as retirement
distributions to the alternate payee 47 rather than to the individual for
whom the retirement benefit was accumulated. This treatment also
parallels the normal income tax treatment of QDROs.
C.

Lump Sum Distributionsand the Bunching Problem

Because the excise tax applies only to distributions exceeding a
threshold amount of $150,000, individuals who received retirement
distributions bunched over a relatively short period would pay a higher
tax than those who received level payments over a longer period. For
example, a lifetime annuity of $150,000 beginning at age sixty-five has
a value of $1,019,550, using the Treasury's unisex mortality and ten
percent discount tables. 48 A retirement distribution of $321,635 a year
for four years would have the same value, using the same ten percent
discount rate. 49 Yet the lifetime annuity, assuming no other retirement
distributions, results in no excise tax, while the four year payout
generates $25,895 of excise tax per year.
This dramatic difference in tax treatment is not justifiable. The
basic rationale for the excise tax is that it recovers unwarranted tax
benefits. But in our example a tax becomes payable solely because of
the method of payout, not because of any tax benefits received in
accumulating the funds to provide the annuity. In fact, the excise tax
functions in a rather perverse fashion since the lifetime payout prolongs the income tax deferral and thus provides more tax benefits
than the four year annuity.
The excise tax may become a costly trap for the unwary. For
example, many individuals postpone distributions from their retirement savings as long as possible to maximize the benefits of tax deferral. However, benefits must commence by April 1 of the calendar year
following the calendar year in which the individual attains seventy
and one-half.6° The required minimum distribution for the calendar
year is the account balance divided by the life expectancy of the
individual or the joint life expectancy of the individual and a named
beneficiary.51 The Treasury's proposed regulations provide that each
minimum distribution must be made on or before December 31 of the

47. I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(2) (last sentence).
48. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7, Table A (1987).
49. Id. § 20.2031-7, Table B.
50. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(C).
51. Id. § 401(a)(9)(A)(ii); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, F-1, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,070 (July
27, 1987).
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calendar year to which it relates, except for the distribution required
to be made in the calendar year in which the employee turns seventy
52
and one-half, which can be made by April 1 of the following year.
Assume that an employee turns seventy and one-half in 1989 and
must make a minimum distribution of $100,000. The employee postpones the distribution to April 1, 1990. Assume further that the
minimum distribution for 1990 is also $100,000 and that it is made by
the required date of December 31, 1990. A total of $200,000 is distributed in 1990, which triggers an excise tax of $7,500 on the $50,000
excess distribution. Had the first $100,000 distribution been made
anytime in 1989, no excise tax would have been payable. Of course,
by postponing the distribution until 1990 the employee had the benefit
of deferring the income tax on the distribution for one year, but the
excise tax is greater than this benefit.5
Congress has provided limited relief from these inequities only in
the case of a '"lump sum distribution ' ' as to which the taxpayer has
elected special five-year averagingM or grandfathered ten-year averaging. 6 In this case the excess distribution is computed separately with
respect to the lump sum distribution and other retirement distributions, and the threshold amount of the lump sum distribution is five
times the usual threshold amount. 57 For example, a lump sum distribution of $1,019,550 is subject to a threshold amount of five times
$150,000 or $750,000. The excess distribution of $269,550 is subject

52.
53.

Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-1, F-1, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,070 (July 27, 1987).
Assuming the employee is in the 28% tax bracket, the deferral of the tax on the $100,000

for one year is equivalent to an interest-free loan of $28,000. Even assuming a 10% interest
rate, this benefit is worth only $2,800, compared to the $7,500 excise tax.
54.

A lump sum distribution is defined as

[t~he distribution or payment within one taxable year of the recipient of the balance
to the credit of an employee which becomes payable to the recipient (i) on account

of the employee's death, (ii) after the employee attains age 59 , (iii) on account
of the employee's separation from service, or (iv) after the employee has become
disabled.
I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(A).
55. Five-year averaging may be elected only if (1) the lump sum distribution is received

on or after the taxpayer has attained age 59 , and (2) the taxpayer applies the averaging to
all lump sum distributions received during the taxable year. No more than one such election
may be made by any taxpayer with respect to any employee. I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(B).
56. Individuals who have attained age 50 by January 1, 1986 and elect special lump sum
averaging may elect to average over 10 years instead of five, but they must then use the tax
rates in effect for 1986 to compute the tax. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100

Stat. 2085, § 1122(h)(5).
57.

I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(4).
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to the fifteen percent rate, resulting in an excise tax of $40,433. Compared with the computations above, it is greater than the tax on a
life annuity, but less than the tax on the four-year payout.
The favorable treatment of qualifying lump sum distributions becomes even more pronounced if other retirement distributions are
received during the same taxable year. Each type of distribution is
treated separately in computing the excess distribution. 5 Thus an
employee could receive a $750,000 lump sum distribution from a qualified plan, plus an additional $150,000 in other retirement distributions,
and pay no excise tax. If the $750,000 were instead paid out as a
$123,922 annuity,r 9 there would be an annual excise tax of $18,588 on
the total annual retirement distribution of $273,922.
While this technique of dividing distributions from multiple plans
into lump sum and non-lump sum distributions is an important planning
device for minimizing the effect of the fifteen percent excise tax, it
may not be appropriate in all cases. Rolling over a lump sum distribution to an individual retirement account, for instance, can produce
significant savings by deferring income taxes to future years. The
excise tax is just one more factor to consider in the already complex
decision whether to elect special lump sum averaging.
There seems little justification for allowing an individual maximum
use of both the $750,000 lump sum threshold amount and the annual
$150,000 threshold amount. Congress appears content to permit individuals to receive $150,000 per year and to have retirement accumulations sufficient to fund a $150,000 life annuity before any section
4981A taxes are paid. To mitigate potential unfairness to recipients
of lump sum distributions, Congress has provided for tax-free distributions that are clearly greater than its notion of what is an excessive
benefit.
On the other hand, in some cases the special lump sum rule triggers
unwarranted taxation of lump sum distributions. If the purpose of the
taxes is to recover some of the tax benefits of excessive retirement
savings, there should be no difference in treatment between an individual who receives a lump sum distribution equal to the present value
of an annuity and an individual who receives an annuity. Consider A
and B, each aged seventy on December 31. On December 31, A receives a $1,057,830 cash distribution from an employer plan. On the
same day, however, B receives $150,000 from a plan and is further

58. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, c-1(a)(3), (d), Ex. 2 (1987).
59. Using the Treasury's unisex 10% valuation tables, a $123,922 life annuity for a 70-yearold is worth $750,000.73. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), Table A (1987).
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entitled to receive $150,000 annually on that date until death. Under
the Treasury's valuation tables, the payments to be made to B in the
future are worth $907,830, exactly the additional amount paid to A.
Even under the special lump sum rule, A must pay an excise tax of
$46,174, which is fifteen percent of the excess over $750,000. B pays
no excise tax. Yet if we assume that the contributions to the retirement
plans over the years were identical, the tax benefits received by A
and B up to the time of the distribution are also identical.
These defects in the special lump sum rule can be eliminated easily.
First, in any year in which an individual receives a lump sum distribution, distributions in excess of the threshold amount should be
treated as "excess distributions" only to the extent they exceed the
present value of a life annuity with annual payments equal to the
threshold amount. Under this approach neither A nor B in the example
above would be liable for the excise tax.
Second, to coordinate the excise taxation of a lump sum distribution
with future distributions, the threshold amount in future years should
be reduced by a fraction equal to the lump sum distribution in excess
of the threshold amount divided by the present value of a life annuity
with annual payments equal to the threshold amount. Thus, if A in
the above example had received a lump sum distribution of $452,610,
equal to $150,000 plus one-third of the value of a $150,000 life annuity,
A's $150,000 threshold amount in future years would be reduced by
one-third, to $100,000. If A had received the full $1,057,830, A's
threshold amount in future years would be zero and all additional
distributions would be subject to the excise tax.
This proposal would not be difficult to administer. During an individual's lifetime only one special lump sum election can be made.6°
Thus computing the value of the annuity and the resulting adjustment
to the threshold amount for future years would only be done once.
At the cost of additional complexity, one could in principle solve the
bunching problem by generalizing the proposed treatment of lump
sum distributions to all distributions. Each year's distribution in excess
of the threshold amount would then be excluded from excise taxation
to the extent it did not exceed the present value of a life annuity of
the threshold amount. However, each tax-free distribution in excess
of the threshold amount would reduce the threshold amount applicable
in future years by the fraction of that present value represented by
the distribution. This treatment eliminates the bunching problem without compromising Congress' general notion of what is excessive. Un-

60.

I.R.C. § 402(e)(4)(B).
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999

fortunately, it would require recipients of retirement distributions to
perform and keep track of complicated annual computations. This is
a horrendous prospect Congress would probably be wise to avoid. The
main weakness of the excise tax is that it focuses only on the distributions in any one year. That weakness is also its greatest strength,
namely simplicity.
D.

Community Property

The definition of "excess distributions" makes no specific reference
to community property. The Joint Committee's General Explanation
states that 'the operation of community property laws is disregarded
' 61
in determining the amount of such aggregate annual distributions,"
but in a footnote suggests that a technical correction may be needed
so that the statute reflects this intentY6 Such a correction seems unnecessary and is not, in fact, contained in the proposed Technical
Corrections Bill. The reason is that the term "excess distributions" is
already defined as including the "aggregate amount of the retirement
distributions with respect to any individual." Thus, although a retirement benefit may constitute community property, it is still a distribution with respect to the employee covered by the retirement plan or,
in the case of an IRA, with respect to the individual for whom the
account was established.
It may be possible, however, to split a community property retirement benefit between a husband and wife through the use of a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO). Typically a QDRO is issued in the
context of a divorce or separation. But the statute is worded so that
it may also apply to court orders that simply convert community
property into separate property. A QDRO is defined as a "domestic
relations order" that (1) "creates or recognizes the existence of an
alternate payee's right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right
to, receive all or a portion of [retirement plan] benefits payable, and
(2) meets certain other requirements relating to specificity and nonalteration of plan benefits."' For this purpose the term "domestic relations order" is defined as
[a]ny judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a
property settlement agreement) which -

61.
62.
63.

GENERAL EXPLANATION,

supra note 46, at 756.

Id. at 756 n.25.
I.R.C. § 414(p)(1)(A).
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(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or maritalproperty rights to a spouse, former spouse,
child, or other dependent of a participant, and
relations law
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic
4
(including a community property law).
Neither the statute nor the legislative history specifies that a
QDRO must occur in connection with a divorce or separation. Thus,
if under local law a couple in an intact marriage could obtain a court
order confirming a division of community property, the order would
appear to meet the literal requirements of the statute. The order
would be one relating to a spouse's marital property rights made
pursuant to a state community property law, which creates or "recognizes" the spouse's right to the plan benefits.
Dividing a community property retirement benefit by means of a
QDRO could produce significant excise tax savings. For example, assume that a wife has interests in qualified profit-sharing and pension
plans that would enable her to receive distributions of $300,000 a year
for life. The excise tax on such distributions would amount to $22,500
a year (fifteen percent of the distribution in excess of the $150,000
threshold amount). However, if she could obtain a QDRO dividing the
plan benefits with her husband so that each received $150,000, no tax
would result because the distribution to the husband is treated as a
retirement distribution to him and neither distribution exceeds

$150,000.
The technique would not be so useful for lump sum distributions
because an alternate payee under a QDRO may not elect special averaging and therefore may not take advantage of the increased excise
tax threshold amount normally available for lump sum distributions.
Nor could the technique be used with IRAs since QDROs are not
applicable to them. 6
If state court orders approving voluntary partition of community
property agreements can qualify as QDROs, taxpayers in community
property states would be more favorably taxed than equivalent tax-

64.

Id. § 414(p)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

65. Id. § 402(e)(4)(M).
66. Id. § 4 14 (p)(9 ). The only way an IRA in the name of one spouse could be transferred
to the other spouse during life without being considered a taxable distribution is under a divorce

decree or under a written instrument incident to a divorce. Id. § 408(d)(6). This is true even
if the IRA were community property and was merely being split into the spouses' separate
property because the IRA rules apply "without regard to any community property laws." Id.

§ 408 (g).
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payers in common law property states. Taxpayers in common law
states could achieve the same tax benefits only in the context of a
divorce or separation. Such differential treatment is unfair and has
largely been eliminated from both the income and estate taxes.7 One
solution would be to redefine QDROs to exclude orders outside the
context of divorce or separation. This has the drawback of creating
some sensitive administrative problems and inevitably some will be
tempted to divorce, obtain a QDRO, and remarry.6 Of course this
temptation already exists under current law in those jurisdictions
where QDROs are unavailable outside the the divorce or separation
context.
Another possible solution would be to provide for a type of joint
return of the excise tax. Married couples would have to aggregate
their retirement distributions, but they would receive double the normal threshold for determining what is an excess distribution. Even
apart from concerns regarding the use of QDROs, this approach seems
more consistent with the tax law's general treatment of the married
couple as an appropriate tax unit. Consider the couple H1 and W1.
W1 is receiving joint and survivor annuities of $300,000 per year from
qualified plans. H1 has no retirement benefits. W1 must pay the excise
tax of $22,500 on her excess distribution of $150,000. But another
couple, H2 and W2, is also receiving $300,000 per year in joint and
survivor annuities, but it is equally divided: H2 thus receives $150,000
per year from his plans, and W2 receives an identical amount from
hers. H2 and W2 pay no excise taxes. Yet the total tax benefit flowing
to both couples by reason of their accumulated retirement savings is
identical, assuming plan contributions and earnings were identical.
Unfortunately, an excise tax structure that treats these two couples
identically may not be fair to other taxpayers, especially single taxpayers. These problems mirror the difficulty of choosing the appropriate taxable unit for the income tax.6 Some commentators have argued
67. E.g., id. § 6013 (joint income tax returns); § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction). There
are, however, lingering inequities. Compare id. § 1014(b)(6) (both husband and wife's share of
community property receives fair market value basis at death of either) with id. § 1014(b)(9)
(only one-half of spousal joint tenancy property receives fair market value basis at death of
either, due to the operation of id. § 2040(b)).
68. The sham-transaction doctrine may apply to such attempts. See Boyter v. Commissioner,
668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981) (the doctrine applies where the married couple attempted to
procure divorce papers rather than'effect a real dissolution of the marriage); Rev. Rul. 76-255,
1976-2 C.B. 40. See also Note, The HaitianVacation: The Applicability of Sham Doctrine to
Year-End Divorces, 77 MIcH. L. REV. 1332 (1979) (examining the propriety of applying the
sham doctrine to tax motivated divorces).
69. See generally Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1389 (1975) (discussing the propriety and ramifications of consolidating family income).
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that marital status should not be relevant in determining one's level
of income taxation.7o Nevertheless, given the fact that the income tax
treats these couples identically, it seems anomalous that the excise
tax does not.
III.

ESTATE TAx ON EXCESS RETIREMENT ACCUMULATIONS

A. Description
Although Congress could have continued applying the annual fifteen
percent excise tax on excess distributions to post-death distributions,
it decided instead to impose an additional estate tax equal to fifteen
percent of the decedent's "excess retirement accumulation.

71

The ex-

cess retirement accumulation is defined as the excess (if any) of the
value of the decedent's interests in qualified employer plans and individual retirement plans over the present value of an annuity with
annual payments equal to the threshold amount used for determining
lifetime excess distributions, and payable over a period equal to the
life expectancy of the decedent immediately before death.7 Both the
decedent's interests and the hypothetical annuity are valued on the
decedent's death or on an alternate valuation date elected under section
2032.n
The present value of the hypothetical annuity is determined under
rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. The Conference
Committee report states that "the Secretary may, by regulations,
prescribe a range of interest rates and other permissible assumptions
for purposes of applying the excise tax."''74 The temporary regulations
provide that the present value of the annuity is to be calculated using
the interest rate and mortality assumptions in section 20.2031-7 of the
Estate Tax Regulations.7 5

The Technical Corrections Bill would redefine the hypothetical annuity to be the present value of a single life annuity with annual
payments equal to the threshold amount for excess distributions, as
in effect for the year in which death occurs and as if the individual
had not died. 76 It may seem that there is little difference between the

70.

See, e.g., Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax

Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1980).
71. I.R.C. § 4981A(d)(1).
72. Id. § 4981A(d)(3).
73. Id.
74. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 29, at 11477.
75. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, d-7(c) (1987).
76. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(6).
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value of a life annuity and the value of an annuity payable over the
life expectancy, but actuarially the two are quite different. The Technical Corrections Bill's definition will generally result in a lower value
for the hypothetical annuity and therefore a higher additional estate
tax.
For instance, assume that the decedent's interests in qualified employer plans and individual retirement plans were valued at $2,000,000
when decedent died at age seventy. Using the unisex life expectancy
assumptions embodied in the Treasury's annuity regulations, the decedent had a life expectancy of sixteen years.7 Using the Treasury's
standard estate valuation tables, which assume a ten percent discount
rate, the present value of a $150,000 annuity payable for sixteen years
is $1,173,555.7 The excess retirement accumulation would then be
$826,445, resulting in an additional estate tax of $123,966. However,
using the Treasury's estate tax valuation tables, the present value of
an annuity of $150,000 payable for life to a seventy year old is only
$907,830. 79 This produces an excess retirement accumulation of
$1,092,170 and an additional estate tax of $163,826, an increase of
almost $40,000 over the current law tax.
The annuity proposed in the Technical Corrections Bill is more
consistent with the goals of the new taxes. Congress has determined
that retirement distributions in excess of $150,000 per year are excessive. It would therefore seem appropriate to permit an individual to
accumulate sufficient tax-favored retirement savings to fund a $150,000
lifetime annuity. Any greater accumulation is properly treated as excessive. Since the temporary regulations anticipate this correction, 80
tax computations in this article will reflect this approach.
B.

The Meaning of "Interests"

The amount of an individual's excess retirement accumulation is
based on the value of the individual's "interests" in qualified employer
plans and IRAs.81 This term is not defined and leaves unclear the
treatment of those interests that are not the decedent's property. An
example of the unclarity is the treatment of a survivor's annuity interest. Assume the decedent had retired and was receiving a joint
and survivor annuity with a spouse. The spouse's interest in the an-

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Table V (1987).
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(f), Table B (1987).
Id. § 20.2031-7(f), Table A.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, d-7(a) (1987).
I.R.C. § 4981A(d)(3)(A).
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nuity is hardly a property interest of the decedent. The decedent
cannot alter the spouse's interest in any way. In fact, if the annuity
is paid from a defined benefit plan, the decedent could not have de2
prived the spouse of the survivor annuity without the spouse's consent.
The legislative history is silent concerning survivor annuities, but
Congress probably intended them to be subject to tax at the death
of the employee spouse. The House Ways and Means Committee Report describes the section 4981A(d) tax as providing "special rules to
calculate the extent to which retirement distributions made with respect to a participant after the participant's death are excess distributions." 83 Section 4981A(e)(1)(A) defines "retirement distribution" for
purposes of the lifetime excise tax to mean "With respect to any individual, the amount distributed... under any qualified employer plan
with respect to which such individual is or was the employee,"'
strongly implying that the drafters of the section 4981A(d) tax considered survivor benefits to be within its reach. If the survivor annuity
were excluded, this very same language would also relieve the survivor
of any liability for the lifetime excise tax on excess distributions because any distribution to the survivor is not made under a plan with
respect to which the survivor is or was the employee. Such a wholesale
exclusion of survivor benefits seems unlikely. The treasury regulations
properly take the position that all amounts payable to beneficiaries of
the decedent under any qualified employer plan (including survivor
annuities) or individual retirement plan are considered to be part of
the decedent's interest in such plan. 5
A second example of an ambiguous 'interest" is the surviving
spouse's one-half interest in community property. Because such property is not considered property owned by the decedent at the decedent's death, neither should it be an "interest" of the decedent. This
interpretation would lead to the inconsistent treatment of pre-death
and post-death distributions. A pre-death distribution is fully subject
to the excise tax notwithstanding its community property character.
The Joint Committee Explanation states that the excess retirement
accumulation is to be computed without regard to community property
laws, but notes that a technical correction may be needed so that the

82. Defined benefit plans and most money purchase pension plans must provide retirement
benefits in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity, unless both the participant and
the spouse elect another form of benefit. Id. §§ 401(a)(11)(A)(i), (B)(i), (ii).
83. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 747.
84. I.R.C. § 4981A(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
85. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-lT, d-5(b) (1987).
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statute reflects this intent. The Technical Corrections Bill contains
a provision to this effect,7 and the temporary regulations anticipate
this correction.
The term "interest" may also include benefits already subjected to
the tax. For example, assume A dies owning an IRA with B as the
named beneficiary. A's interest in the IRA is clearly an "interest"
subject to the section 4981A(d) tax. But suppose B then dies with
some undistributed assets still in A's IRA. B certainly has an interest
in the IRA even if it is technically not B's IRA. Yet Congress clearly
did not intend to subject benefits to two section 4981A taxes 9 The
Technical Corrections Bill would resolve the problem by excluding
from those interests subject to the tax any interest of the decedent
"as a beneficiary." 90
Congress could resolve these ambiguities in a more straightforward
fashion by providing a statutory definition of the term "interest" just
as it did for the term "retirement distribution." Thus "interest in a
qualified employer plan and individual retirement plan" could be defined to mean, with respect to any individual, any benefits under (A)
any qualified employer plan with respect to which such individual was
the employee, or (B) any individual retirement plan of such individual.
C.

Credits and Exclusions

Section 4981A(d)(2) disallows only the use of the unified credit
normally available for estate tax purposes against the additional tax
on excess accumulations. The legislative history indicates quite clearly
that Congress intended that the additional tax not be offset by any
credits against the estate tax.91 The Technical Corrections Bill would
amend the statute to reflect this original intent. 92
The current definition of excess retirement accumulation contains
no exclusions. None of the normal estate tax deductions, such as the
charitable deduction, the marital deduction, and deductions for administrative expenses and claims against the estate, may be used to
reduce the tax. The lack of these deductions and the disallowance of

86. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supm note 46, at '757.
87. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(B).
88. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, c-8 (1987).
89. The House Report notes that "[a]fter the estate tax is imposed, post-death distributions
are disregarded entirely in applying this tax." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 747.
90. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(9).
91. CONFERENCE REPORT, supmr note 29, at 11-477.
92. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(A). This correction is anticipated by the temporary regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, d-8 (1987).
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any credits seem consistent with the purpose of the additional estate
tax, to recover a portion of the income tax benefits that have accrued
to excessive retirement savings, without the administrative problems
of year-by-year income taxation of post-death distributions.
Yet precisely because the additional estate tax is a substitute for
a continuation of the fifteen percent excise tax on excess distributions,
it seems appropriate to exclude from the additional estate tax those
interests that would be excluded from the excise tax if they were
distributed. Thus the value of amounts payable to an alternate payee
under a QDRO which would not have been subject to the excise tax
if paid during the decedent's lifetime should not give rise to additional
estate tax. Similarly, interests representing a decedent's after-tax
contribution to a qualified plan or an IRA should be excluded. The
Technical Corrections Bill would exclude the value of both of these
interests from the computation of the excess retirement accumulation.9
The Technical Corrections Bill also would exclude the value of
certain death benefits. The exclusion is defined as the excess (if any)
of the value of any interests payable immediately after death over the
value of the interests before death.9 For example, a qualified pension
or profit sharing plan may provide a life insurance policy for the
benefit of the participant. To the extent deductible employer contributions or trust income are used to purchase the policies, the cost of
this life insurance protection must be included in the employee's gross
income.9 5 When the death benefits are paid from the proceeds of the
policy, only the cash surrender value of the policy is treated as a
distribution from the plan; the excess is treated as a receipt of life
insurance proceeds and thus is tax exempt. 96 Since this excess is not
traceable to the tax subsidy granted retirement plans, excluding it
from the reach of the additional estate tax is sensible.
D. A Proposed "MaritalDeduction"
Unlike the normal estate tax, the additional estate tax imposed by
section 4981A(d) does not currently contain an exclusion for interests
transferred to a surviving spouse. However, the Technical Corrections
Bill would allow a spouse who is the beneficiary of all of an individual's
93. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(B). This correction is anticipated by the temporary regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-1T, d-6(a), (b) (1987).
94. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(B).
95. I.R.C. § 72(m)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16(b) (1987).
96. I.R.C. § 72(m)(3)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.72-16(c) (1987).
97. Persons other than the surviving spouse may be the beneficiary of a de minimis portion
of the deceased spouse's interests without affecting the spouse's right to make the election.
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interests in qualified employer plans and IRAs to elect not to have
the section 4981A(d) tax apply, but instead treat the interests as if
they were the spouse's. 98 Distributions to the surviving spouse would
then be subject to the general excise tax on excess distributions to
the extent that they, when added to distributions from the spouse's
own benefits from qualified employer plans or IRAs, exceed the
threshold amount for the excise tax. 99
Thus surviving spouses could substitute a continuation of the annual
excise tax as distributions occur for the single levy of the additional
estate tax. Whether a spouse should make the election would depend
on a variety of factors, including the projected future distributions
(which may require investment return and mortality assumptions),
the respective ages of the decedent and the surviving spouse, and the
amount of the surviving spouse's own retirement accumulations. For
example, assume that a decedent and surviving spouse, both age seventy, have each accumulated $1,200,000 in qualified employer plans
and IRAs. Without the benefit of the election, the decedent's estate
would be liable for a section 4981A(d) tax of $43,826.100 But if the
spouse were to make the election and die shortly thereafter, all of
the decedent's $1,200,000 would be an excess retirement accumulation
resulting in a section 4981A(d) tax of $180,000, plus whatever tax
would be due on the surviving spouse's own excess retirement accumulation. Of course, the spouse might live quite a few years and succeed
in reducing the retirement accumulations through lifetime withdrawals. However, even this scenario would likely result in substantially
higher taxes than if no election were made. Since lifetime distributions
in excess of $150,000 would be subject to the fifteen percent excise
tax, undistributed assets in the various plans would likely produce
additional earnings. As the surviving spouse aged, more of the spouse's
retirement accumulation would be "excess," because the present value
of the hypothetical $150,000 annuity would be lower. Proper analysis
of the election will therefore frequently require sophisticated computations. Computer programs are already being developed to accomplish
this task.

Technical Corrections Bill § 10211A(g)(5)(B). Furthermore, if the spouse makes the election,
such de minimis amounts will not be subject to either the excise tax on excess distributions or
the additional estate tax. Id. The Joint Committee's description states that de minimis for this

purpose is one percent or less of the decedent's retirement accumulation. DESCRIPTION OF
AcT, supra note 4, at 138.
98.

Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(B).

99. DESCRIPTION OF ACT, supra note 4, at 138.
100. This is equal to 15% of the excess of the $1,200,000 over $907,830, the present value
of a single life annuity of $150,000. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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The reason for the somewhat curious requirement that all of the
decedent's interests in qualified employer plans and IRAs must be
transferred to the spouse is probably to prevent the use of two
threshold amounts to offset a single retirement accumulation. For
example, assume H, aged 70, dies with $1,815,660 in an IRA and W,
also aged 70, has no retirement accumulation. Absent a spousal election, ifs excess accumulation would be $907,830 (the excess of
$1,815,660 over $907,830, the value of a hypothetical single life annuity
of $150,000) resulting in a section 4981A(d) additional estate tax of
$136,175. If W receives the IRA at ifs death and a spousal election
is made, no additional estate tax is due. However, the IRA will be subject
to the section 4981A taxes as if it were W's own retirement accumulations. Thus if W dies shortly after H, with the value of the IRA
unchanged, the additional estate tax of $136,175 would then be due.
The election in this case merely postponed the tax. If H could split
the IRA between W and X, and W could make a spousal election as
to W's share, the tax could be eliminated. At ifs death, one hypothetical life annuity would offset the portion of the IRA passing to X, and
at W's death a second hypothetical annuity would offset the portion
W received.
The prohibition on splitting for spousal election purposes is consistent with the treatment of lifetime distributions, which does not view
a married couple as a single taxable unit for excise tax purposes. As
in the case of lifetime distributions, couples with retirement accumulations concentrated in the hands of one spouse are unfairly disadvantaged compared to couples whose retirement accumulations are more
equally divided. Consider the couple H1 and W1, both age seventy.
Hi has a $1,815,660 IRA and W1 has no retirement accumulation. At
Hi's death, Hi's estate will be liable for a section 4981A(d) tax of
$136,175. The only way the tax can be avoided, and even then it is
only postponed, is if all of the IRA passes to W1 and W1 makes the
spousal election. Thus if Hi prefers to split the IRA between W1 and
another beneficiary, the tax must be paid in full. Now consider another
couple, H2 and W2, who also have $1,815,660 in IRAs, but the assets
are divided equally between their separate IRAs. At H2's death, H2's
IRA can be left to another beneficiary without any section 4981A(d)
tax being due, because there is no excess retirement accumulations. 101

101. This may be undesirable from the viewpoint of mnimizing the normal estate tax.
Assuming H has the full unified credit, $600,000 can be passed to a non-spousal beneficiary
free of estate tax. If the full $907,830 is left to a non-spousal beneficiary, an estate tax would
be payable that could otherwise be avoided by taking advantage of the unlimited estate tax
marital deduction.
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At W2's death, little or no section 4981A(d) tax would be payable. H2
and W2 can thus avoid the section 4981A taxes, while H1 and W1
cannot. Yet the total tax benefit both couples receive due to their tax
favored retirement savings is identical, assuming the timing of contributions and earnings were identical. The policy implications of this
anomaly have already been noted in the context of lifetime distributions.102
The spousal election provided in the Technical Corrections Bill
would also solve another technical problem with the section 4981A(d)
tax, at least in those cases when the election is made. Congress clearly
intended that once the section 4981A(d) tax was imposed, post-death
distributions would be disregarded in applying the excise tax. 103 Generally, an individual who inherits an IRA cannot make further contributions to the inherited account °4 or even roll it over into the
individual's own IRA. 105 Nor may the beneficiary of a qualified employer plan following the death of the employee roll over distributions
from the plan into an IRA. 1° These inherited assets therefore remain
segregated from the beneficiary's own IRAs and qualified plans, which
are potentially subject to the section 4981A taxes. However, these
limitations on rollovers and contributions to inherited IRAs do not
apply if the individual inheriting the IRA'0 or the employer plan' 0° is
a surviving spouse. Thus it is possible that a decedent's interest in
an IRA or qualified plan, if left to a surviving spouse, could be subjected to the fifteen percent section 4981A(d) tax at the decedent's
death and then subjected again to either the fifteen percent excise
tax during the life of the surviving spouse or the section 4981A(d) tax
at the surviving spouse's death. It would be possible to construct a
method for allocating the taxable and non-taxable portions of the surviving spouse's IRAs to avoid double taxation, but it would be exceedingly complex. The Treasury has opted instead for an easily administrable rule. Under the temporary regulations, if an inherited retirement accumulation is mixed in an IRA with new or existing contributions of the surviving spouse, the entire amount of the mixed IRA
will be subject to the section 4981A taxes when distributions occur
or upon the death of the surviving spouse.' 9 The Treasury's position,
102.

103.

See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 24, at 747.

104. I.R.C. § 219(d)(4).
105. Id. § 408(d)(3)(C).
106.
107.

Id. § 402(a)(5)(A).
Id. § 408(d)(3)(C)(ii).

108. Id. § 402(a)(7).
109.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-lT(d)-10 (1987).
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while certainly self-serving, is reasonable given the extraordinary difficulty of making a proper allocation. Surviving spouses can easily
maintain separate IRAs and avoid double taxation. While this occasionally may entail some modest transactional cost due the maintenance
of multiple IRAs, these costs would be miniscule compared to the
costs, both to the taxpayer and the Service, of administering an accurate allocation rule.
E. Problems With Treatingthe Section 4981A Tax as anEstate Tax
No theoretical justification exists for classifying the section
4981A(d) tax as an estate tax. As already noted, the tax was enacted
as an alternative to subjecting post-death distributions to the annual
tax on excess distributions. Presumably Congress thought that this
would be an administratively easier way of accomplishing its goal of
recapturing what it viewed as excessive income tax benefits. By making section 4981A(d) an additional estate tax, Congress was able to
use an existing tax collection mechanism to do double duty and to use
a taxpayer, namely the decedent's estate, that is already accustomed
to paying taxes by reason of a decedent's death.
Unfortunately, the drafters of section 4981A did not fully appreciate
the ramifications of classifying the excise tax as an estate tax. This
classification triggers the operation of numerous statutory provisions
that are inappropriate for the excise tax. Perhaps the most significant
is section 2053(c)(1)(B), which disallows the deduction of estate taxes
for purposes of computing the taxable estate. Under this provision
the section 4981A(d) tax would be nondeductible for estate tax purposes. The drafters of section 4981A and even the original Technical
Corrections Bill failed to recognize that this is incorrect. Eventually
the problem was understood and the current draft of the Technical
Corrections Bill permits the section 4981A(d) tax to be deductible by
adding a special exception to section 2053(c)(1)(B). 110
The correctness of this approach is confirmed when one considers
the problem of income in respect of a decedent (IRD). Post-death
proceeds from qualified pension and profit-sharing plans, tax-sheltered
annuities, IRAs and similar plans are all considered IRD.11 ' Under
section 691(c), a person who includes income in respect of a decedent
in gross income receives an income tax deduction for a portion of the
estate tax attributable to items of IRD.

110. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(11).
111. Hess v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959) (qualified pension and profit-sharing
trusts).
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An immediate question is whether the section 4981A(d) tax is an
"estate tax" for this purpose. Section 691(c)(2)(A) defines "estate tax"
to mean "the tax imposed on the estate of a decedent or any prior
decedent under section 2001 or 2101, reduced by the credits against
such tax." Since the section 4981A(d) tax is defined as an increase in
the "tax imposed by chapter 11 with respect to the estate of any
individual" and chapter 11 includes sections 2001 and 2101, it could
certainly be argued that the section 4981A(d) tax is to be treated as
an estate tax for IRD purposes. This was actually the view adopted
by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation as expressed in the
General Explanation.1H
Unfortunately, this interpretation is inconsistent with both the
mechanics of the computation of the IRD deduction and its underlying
rationale, which is to make the total income and estate tax burden on
income type items of property approximately the same whether the
item is collected before or after death. 113 As to the mechanical problem,
the IRD deduction is generally computed by first creating a fraction
in which the numerator is the IRD received by the taxpayer during
the year and included in income, and the denominator is the value of
all IRD included in the decedent's gross estate. This fraction is then
multiplied by the estate tax attributable to all IRD included in the
decedent's gross estate. 14 The estate tax attributable to the IRD is
defined as "an amount equal to the excess of the estate tax over the
estate tax computed without including in the gross estate such net
value." 115 Applied literally, this would make none of the section
4981A(d) tax attributable to the IRD, because the tax is not based
on the IRD's inclusion in the gross estate.
An IRD income tax deduction is also inappropriate as means of
approximately equalizing the total tax burden on pre-death and postdeath distributions. For example, assume that D is currently receiving
$150,000 a year from a profit-sharing plan, and that the value of D's
interests in qualified employer plans and IRAs is high enough to

112. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 46, at 758 ("For purposes of the rules relating
to income in respect of a decedent (§ 691), the amount of the excise tax on excess distributions
with respect to a decedent is treated as an estate tax paid.').
113.

See M. FERGUSON, J. FREELAND, & R. STEPHENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

OF ESTATES AND BENEFICIARIES 284-285 (1970); S. SURREY, P. McDANIEL, & H. GUTMAN,

FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 127 (1987).

114. I.R.C. § 691(c)(1)(A). See Estate of Kincaid v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 25, 26-27 (1985).
Detailed rules as to the computation under this general rule are contained in the Regulations.
Treas. Reg. § 1.691(c)-1, -2.
115. I.R.C. § 691(c)(2)(C).
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subject D's estate to the section 4981A(d) tax upon death. Consider
the taxation of a $10,000 IRA account owned by D. For simplicity,
assume that both D and D's beneficiaries are in the twenty-eight
percent income tax bracket and that D is in the fifty percent estate
tax bracket. If D withdraws the $10,000 and then dies, the total tax
burden on the IRA is $7,150: the income tax of $2,800, the excise tax
of $1,500, and the estate tax of $2,850 on the remaining $5,700. If D
dies before withdrawing the account, the estate will pay a regular
estate tax of $5,000 and an additional section 4981A(d) tax of $1,500
on the IRA. When the IRA is withdrawn, assuming that an IRD
deduction is allowed for both the regular estate tax and the section
4981A(d) tax attributable to the IRA, the beneficiary will pay an
income tax of $1,750. The total tax burden on the IRA would be
$8,250, over $1,000 higher than the burden if withdrawn before death.
The current Technical Corrections Bill recognizes that the proper
treatment is to deny an IRD deduction for the section 4981A(d) tax
and instead permit it to be deducted from the gross estate for estate
tax purposes. This succeeds in equalizing the tax burden. The estate
would pay a section 4981A(d) tax of $1,500 and a regular estate tax
of $4,250, equal to fifty percent of $8,500. When the IRA is distributed,
an IRD deduction for the regular estate tax attributable to the IRA
would be allowed. Note that by the statutory definition this is not
$4,250, but rather $5,000, because section 4981A(d) tax has nothing
to do with the IRA's inclusion or exclusion from the gross estate.
Thus excluding the IRA from the gross estate would reduce the estate
tax by $5,000; therefore, for IRD purposes this is the estate tax
attributable to the IRA. The income tax is twenty-eight percent of
$5,000, or $1,400. The total tax burden on the IRA would then be
$7,150, exactly the same as in the case of a pre-death withdrawal.
Allowing an estate tax deduction for the section 4981A(d) tax also
solves another problem raised by the "estate tax" label. The estate
tax charitable and marital deductions must both be reduced by the
amount of any estate taxes payable out of the charitable or marital
bequest."1 6 Without an estate tax deduction for the section 4981A(d)
tax, this rule could result in an otherwise nontaxable estate having
to pay a regular estate tax merely because of the payment of the
7
section 4981A(d) tax."1

116. Id. §§ 2055(c) (charitable deduction); 2056(b)(4)(A) (marital deduction).
117. For example, assume that a decedent dies at age 70 with an estate consisting of
$2,000,000 in various profit sharing plans and IRAs, and leaves all of these funds to charity.
The additional § 4981A estate tax would be $163,825 (15% of $1,092,170, the excess retirement
accumulation). Since the charity receives the entire estate, this tax must be paid out of the
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Allowing an estate tax deduction for the section 4981A(d) tax does
not, however, solve all of the problems arising from the estate tax
classification. For example, section 2013 provides an estate tax credit
for all or part of the federal estate tax paid on prior transfers. The
credit would therefore be available .ifan employee died leaving a
$2,000,000 account in a profit-sharing plan to a child and then the
child died within ten years. No policy justification exists for allowing
the child's estate any credit based on the section 4981A(d) tax paid
by the parents estate. The section 4981A(d) tax is designed to recover
excessive income tax benefits. The child's estate is not subject to a
second section 4981A(d) tax and any credit given for the prior payment
would defeat the purpose of recovering the excessive tax benefits.
The Technical Corrections Bill would achieve the correct result by
amending section 2013 to exclude the section 4981A(d) tax from the
definition of estate tax paid for purposes of that section. There would
be no need for such ad hoc solutions if the section 4981A(d) were not
mislabelled an estate tax in the first place. 118
F. Payment and Apportionment of the Tax
Congress' failure to consider carefully the ramifications of its ambiguous labelling of the section 4981A(d) tax as an increase in 'the
tax imposed by chapter 11" also raises questions regarding the payment of the tax. Presumably an extension of time for paying the tax
is available under section 6161(a)(2) because that section expressly
refers to "the tax imposed by chapter 11." But section 6166, which

charitable bequest, thus reducing the charitable deduction by the amount of the tax. If this
additional estate tax were not deductible from the gross estate, the decedent's taxable estate
would be $163,825. If the decedent had not used up the unified credit through lifetime gifts, it
could be used to reduce the regular estate tax to zero. But if the unified credit had already
been exhausted, apparently a regular estate tax would be due. But since this too must be paid
out of the charitable bequest, the charitable deduction is further reduced, which increases the
regular estate tax. The exact tax must then be computed using trial and error computations or
mathematical formulas. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-3(b) (1987). The same result would occur in the
case of a marital bequest.
118. Of course, even if the § 4981A(d) tax were not treated as part of the federal estate
tax, some provisions may take estate taxes into account which might also properly consider the
§ 4981A(d) tax. One example is § 303, which permits certain distributions in redemption of stock
included in the gross estate of a decedent to avoid dividend treatment, but only to the extent
the distribution does not exceed the sum of the estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession taxes,
and the amount of funeral and administrative expenses allowable as deductions to the estate.
Because the § 4981A(d) tax is an unavoidable cash outlay of the estate, seemingly it should be
treated for § 303 purposes in the same fashion as administrative expenses and other levies
imposed because of the decedent's death.
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permits the payment of all or a portion of the estate tax in installments

over a ten year period when the value of a decedent's interest in
closely held business exceeds thirty-five percent of the gross estate,
refers to the "tax imposed by section 2001." If the section 4981A(d)

tax is treated as a tax imposed by section 2001 for this purpose, it
would be possible to defer a portion of the section 4981A(d) tax,
assuming an estate otherwise qualified for deferral under section 6166,

even though none of this tax is attributable to the closely held business. 19
The section 4981A(d) tax also fits rather awkwardly into the existing estate tax return requirements. Under section 6018(a)(1), the
executor is required to file an estate tax return "With respect to the
estate tax" only if the gross estate exceeds $600,000. However, it is
possible for a section 4981A(d) tax to be due even though the gross
estate is less than $600,000.' ° This oversight was not recognized in
the original Technical Corrections Bill but is corrected in the current
version, which expressly requires the filing of an estate tax return if
any section 4981A(d) is due.Y1
Unlike the tax on excess distributions, the section 4981A(d) tax
does not expressly state who shall be liable for the payment of the
tax. However, since the section 4981A(d) tax is phrased as an increase
in the tax imposed by chapter 11, it seems clear that the tax is payable
by the executor of the decedent.= Absent a specific statute or a
direction in the decedent's will, state courts have generally held that
the estate tax is payable out of the residuary estate. m But at least

119. The maximum amount of tax that can be paid in installments under § 6166 is defined
as an amount that bears the same ratio to the tax imposed by § 2001 (reduced by the credits
against such tax) as the value of the qualifying interest in a closely held business bears to the
adjusted gross estate. I.R.C. § 6166(a)(2). For example, if the closely held business is 50% of
the adjusted gross estate, then 50% of the tax imposed by § 2001 can be paid in installments.
If the tax imposed by § 2001 includes the § 4981A(d) tax, then 50% of the § 4981A(d) tax could
be paid in installments as well.
120. For example, under the Technical Corrections Bill's version of § 4981A(d) and using
the Service's 10% unisex tables, a hypothetical $150,000 per year annuity for the life of an 84
year-old is valued at $554,970. Thus if an 84 year old died owning an IRA worth $590,000 and
no other assets, there would be no requirement to file an estate tax return, yet there would
be a § 4981A(d) tax due of $5,254.
121. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(12). The temporary regulations anticipate this
correction. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, c-7(b) (1987).
122. See I.R.C. § 2002. The term "executor" is defined as an executor or administrator,
or, if there is none, any person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the
decedent. I.R.C. § 2203.
123. See Annotation, Ultimate Burden of Estate Tax in Absence of Statute, Will, or Other
Provision, 68 A.L.R.3d 714 (1976).
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half the states have enacted statutes that apportion the estate tax
among the beneficiaries of the probate and non-probate assets. MOther
states have judicially adopted some form of apportionment.'2
Many of the existing statutes may not operate properly in apportioning the section 4981A(d) tax. An initial issue is whether a given
statute would apply to the section 4981A(d) tax. The taxes subject to
apportionment are defined in a variety of ways, but most refer to the
"federal estate tax. "1 The interpretive issue again arises in considering whether the section 4981A(d) tax is an estate tax for purposes of
these state statutes. Arguably, it is merely an excise tax, because it
appears in Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code, entitled "Miscellaneous Excise Taxes." Yet section 4981A(d)(1) defines the tax as an
increase in the "tax imposed by chapter 11.' Since the tax imposed
by chapter 11 is the estate tax, classification as an estate tax seems
unavoidable.
Even if the tax is subject to apportionment, the method employed
in many of the statutes leads to an incorrect result. The reason for
the error is that in many statutes the federal estate tax is apportioned
based on the proportion that the value of the interest in each person
interested in the gross estate bears to the total value of the gross
estate.m Thus if half of the gross estate consists of qualified employer
plans and individual retirement plans, then half of the total estate
tax, including half of the section 4981A(d) tax, would be allocated to
such interests. But since these assets are responsible for generating
all of the section 4981A(d) tax, they should be allocated the entire
tax, not just half.
One solution to this allocation problem would be for the various
states to amend their apportionment acts so that the section 4981A(d)
tax is apportioned only to interests subject to the tax. At least one
state, California, has already done so.m A preferable solution that
avoids the need for state by state enactment would be for Congress

124. See Death Tax Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Discussion and Sample Clauses, 19
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 495, 501 (1984).

125. See, e.g., cases cited at Annotation, Ultimate Burden of Estate Tax in Absence of
Statute, Will, or Other Provision, 68 A.L.R.3d 714, 762 n.40 (1976).
126. See, e.g., UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT AcT (Revised 1964 Act) § 1(6),
8A U.L.A. 290 (Master Ed. 1976).
127. See, e.g., CAL.PROB. CODE § 20111 (West 1987 Supp.); N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 2-1.8(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987); UNIFORM ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT
(Revised 1964 Act) § 2, 8A U.L.A. 290 (Master Ed. 1976).
128. CAL. PROB. CODE § 20114.5, added by 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 128, § 20 at 139

(West).
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to enact legislation giving the executor the right, unless the decedent
otherwise directs by will, to recover the amount of any section
4981A(d) tax from the recipients of those interests giving rise to the
tax. Three provisions already give an executor, unless the decedent
directs otherwise by will, a pro rata right of reimbursement for estate
taxes from beneficiaries of non-probate interests: section 2206 (life
insurance beneficiaries), section 2207 (recipients of property over
which decedent had a power of appointment), and section 2207A (recipients of qualified terminable interest property included in the estate
of a surviving spouse).
Even absent corrective legislation, all state apportionment laws
permit a decedent to apportion the estate tax burden in a manner
different from the statute.m Thus the decedent's will could specify
that the section 4981A(d) tax be equitably apportioned among all persons who receive interests subject to the tax. Such a clause would be
appropriate, for example, if the section 4981A(d) tax were large compared with the residuary estate, so that payment of the tax out of
the residue would distort the testamentary plan. Care would have to
be taken in drafting such clauses to avoid apportioning the tax to
property qualifying for the marital or charitable deduction, because
in some situations that would increase the amount of regular estate
tax.'8°
This do-it-yourself apportionment would not be effective if the section 4981A(d) tax were not considered a federal estate tax, because
the typical apportionment statute applies only to the federal estate
tax and state death taxes.' 3 ' If the section 4981A(d) tax were to lose
its "estate tax" classification, as proposed above, the need for a congressionally enacted apportionment rule would be even more pressing.

129. See Death Tax Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Discussion and Sample Clauses, 19
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 495, 502 (1984).
130. For example, assume a decedent, aged 70, leaves a $1,000,000 IRA to a surviving

spouse and another $1,000,000 IRA to a child and has no other assets. Assuming a $163,825 §
4981A(d) tax is payable and ignoring other administrative expenses, if the child pays all of the
§ 4981A(d) tax, the decedent's taxable estate is $836,175 ($2,000,000 gross estate less a $1,000,000

marital deduction and $163,825 deduction for the § 4981A(d) tax, as would be allowed by the
Technical Corrections Bill). If each pays one half of the tax, the marital deduction would have
to be reduced by that amount, i.e., $81,912.50, thereby increasing the taxable estate to
$918,087.50.
131. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 20100 (West 1987 Supp.) (the proration statute applies

only to "any estate tax" and this is defined as a tax imposed by any federal or California "estate
tax law").
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IV.

GRANDFATHER RULES

The excise tax on excess distributions generally applies to distributions made after December 31, 1986.1 However, a grandfather rule
allows a taxpayer to elect to exempt any retirement distribution attributable to benefits accrued as of August 1, 1986, provided the value
of the benefit on that date exceeds $562,500.1" Individuals who make
the election must pay a price. The threshold amount for purposes of
computing excess distributions is set at $112,500, indexed for inflation,
rather than the greater of $150,000 or that amount.
The election must be made on an income tax return for a taxable
year ending before January 1, 1989.' Nothing in the statute or the
legislative history indicates that the individual must actually be receiving benefits to make the election. Complex computations will have to
be made for plan participants to determine whether to make the election. The Treasury has clarified matters somewhat by providing in
the temporary regulations exactly how to calculate the portion of each
distribution that is to be treated as a recovery of the grandfather
amount. 35 In many cases the election will not produce any tax benefit
and may even increase the amount of excise tax.'3
132. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, § 1133(c)(1). However,
the tax does not apply to distributions "before January 1, 1988, which are made on account of
the termination of a qualified employer plan if such termination occurred before January 1,
1987." Id. at § 1133(c)(3).
133. I.R.C. § 4981A(c)(5). In the case of a defined contribution plan, the accrued benefit
on August 1, 1986, is the participant's account balance on that date. For defined benefit plans,
the accrued benefit is determined assuming that the participant separated from service on
August 1, 1986. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supm note 29, at 11-477. The temporary regulations
permit an optional averaging scheme if August 1, 1986 falls between the normal valuation dates.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, b-5 (1987). Since the statute uses only the term "accrued
benefit," nonvested benefits are also included in the definition of accrued benefits. See GENERAL
EXPLANATION, supra note 46, at 758. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, b-6 (1987). The
temporary regulations require plan administrators (or trustees, in the case of IRAs) to report
the value of an individual's benefit if so requested. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, b-10 (1987).
134. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, b-3 (1987).
135. Id. § 54.4981A-IT, b-li. An individual can choose to recover the grandfather amount
under either the discretionary method or the attained age method. After the total grandfather
amount is recovered under either method, the tax is determined without regard to any grandfather amount. Under the discretionary method, 10% of each distribution is treated as a recovery
of the grandfather amount, but an individual may elect to accelerate the recovery to 100%. Id.
at b-12. Under the attained age method, the portion of each distribution treated as a recovery
of the grandfather amount is a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of months of
the participant's service between age 35 and August 1, 1986, and the denominator of which is
the total number of months of service after age 35. Id. at b-13. The temporary regulations
provide numerical examples for both methods. Id. at b-14.
136. For example, assume that the individual's accrued benefit on August 1, 1986 was
$600,000, and that in 1990 at age 65 the individual's accrued benefit is $1,019,550, payable at

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [1987], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 39

The section 4981A(d) additional estate tax applies to the estates
of decedents dying after December 31, 1986.137 The current statute is
unclear whether the elective grandfather rule available for accrued
benefits as of August 1, 1986 for purposes of the excise tax on excess

distributions is also available for-the section 4981A(d) tax. The Technical Corrections Bill would clarify that the transitional rule is applicable to the section 4981A(d) tax,'1 and this correction is anticipated
by the temporary regulations. 39 Thus if the grandfather rule applies,
the decedent'% excess accumulation is the excess of the decedent's
retirement accumulation over the greater of (1) the decedent's remaining unrecovered grandfather amount as of the date of death or (2) an
amount equal to the present value of a $112,500 life annuity. As with

the lifetime excise tax, in some cases the election may actually increase
the tax due.140
The Technical Corrections Bill unfortunately raises new problems
as it attempts to solve old ones. As discussed above it adds an election

out of the 4981A(d) tax by a surviving spouse. Does a grandfather
rule election by the decedent carry over to the surviving spouse?

Literally it would seem not because the spousal election requires that
the excise tax section "apply to [the decedent's] interests and any
retirement distribution attributable to such interests as if such interests were the spouse's.''4 On the other hand, would an election

$150,000 per year for life. Under the transitional rule, assuming that the individual elects the
discretionary method and accelerates the rate of recovery, each $150,000 distribution for the
first four years would be exempt from the tax. However, in the fifth year and all future years
there is no unrecovered grandfather amount, and the $150,000 is subject to the excise tax, using
$112,500 (indexed) as the ceiling amount. Thus $37,500 of the distribution (assuming no increase
in the indexed ceiling) is an excess distribution subject to the 15% excise tax. If no transitional
election had been made, the ceiling amount would be $150,000 and no tax would be due on any
year's payment.
137. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, § 1133(c)(2).
138. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(4)(A).
139. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.4981A-IT, d-4.
140. For example, assume that the individual's accrued benefit on August 1, 1986 is $600,000,
and that in 1990 at age 70 the individual dies with an interest in the plan worth $907,830, never
having received any distributions. If no election had been made, there would be no § 4981A(d)
tax due, since the value of the interest does not exceed the value of the hypothetical $150,000
annuity over the decedent's life expectancy, which under the Treasury's tables is $907,830.
However, if the election had been made, the hypothetical annuity would be $112,500, instead
of $150,000 per year, and its value using the Treasury's tables would be $680,872. Since this
exceeds the accrued benefit value of $600,000, the excess retirement accumulation would be
$226,958 (i.e., $907,830 minus $680,872), resulting in a § 4981A(d) additional estate tax of $34,044.
141. Technical Corrections Bill, § 10211A(g)(5)(B).
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by the surviving spouse also apply to interests received from a deceased spouse? The answer to this question would depend on whether
one interpreted the words "as if such interests were the spouse's" to
also mean "as if the accrued benefit of the decedent as of August 1,
1986 had been the spouse's." If the answer is yes, what treatment is
given a surviving spouse whose accrued benefit as of August 1, 1986
was too low to make the election and the time for the election has
expired?
Note that under the current grandfather rule the amount is fixed
as of August 1, 1986. Once that dollar value is recovered the grandfather rule no longer has any effect. In particular, any income on the
grandfather amount is not itself grandfathered. The House version of
the Technical Corrections Bill would change this so that the grandfathered amount would include income allocable to the accrued benefit.' The provision permits an individual to elect to index the accrued
benefit for inflation, rather than actually compute the income, and
requires such an approach (absent regulations permitting an exception)
if contributions or benefit accruals occur after August 1, 1986. Since
this provision was not in the Senate version and was the only difference
between the two bills, its eventual enactment is uncertain. The complexity raises the issue whether the supposed incremental fairness to
be achieved is outweighed by the transaction costs of implementing it.
Apart from the usual complexity of administration and compliance
problems, a strong argument can be made that transitional relief is
generally undesirable as an economic matter.14 The grandfather rule
in this case operates in an especially perverse fashion to provide a
windfall to many high-bracket taxpayers. The reason for this result
is that, although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in effect imposed a
higher rate of tax on retirement distributions by adding the 4981A
taxes, it also lowered the income tax rates dramatically. The lower
maximum income tax rate provides a massive benefit to those who
have previously accumulated tax-favored retirement savings. Highbracket individuals who may have deferred income when their tax
rate was fifty percent (or more) can now receive distributions taxed
at twenty-eight percent. This twenty-two percent difference, poten-

142.

Id. § 10211A(g)(4)(A).

143. See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 87 (1977) (concluding that '"neither efficiency nor fairness demand [sic]
grandfathered dates"); see also Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,99 HARV.
L. REV. 509 (1986) (suggests reliance on the market to compensate for changing government
policies rather than government provision of transitional relief).
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tially applicable to the entire taxable distribution, surpasses any possible fifteen percent tax on the excess distribution. 144 The grandfather
rule is complex and unwarranted and should be repealed.
V.

FLAWS IN THE BASIC POLICY

This article has focused on the structure of the new taxes and the
technical problems surrounding this structure. Yet even if these technical problems were resolved, the basic approach of the taxes is seriously flawed. As noted, the taxes on excess distributions and retirement accumulations were proposed as a means of recovering unwarranted tax benefits when the annual limitations on contributions and
benefits did not adequately operate. The difficulty is that the amount
of excess distributions from and excess accumulations in qualified employer plans and IRAs does not bear any consistent relationship to
the tax benefits received.
What are these tax benefits? First, the income taxes that would
have been paid on employer or individual contributions to tax-favored
retirement plans are deferred until the contributions are withdrawn.
Second, the income taxes on the retirement plan earnings that would
have been taxable if the investment had been held outside of the plan,
are also deferred until the earnings are withdrawn. This tax deferral
of the contributions and earnings is equivalent to an interest-free loan
from the Treasury. If the tax rate of the individual remains constant,
this interest-free loan is repaid in full when the retirement savings
are withdrawn. However, if the tax rate at the time of withdrawal is
lower than when the contributions or earnings occurred, a portion of
the interest-free loan is in effect forgiven, resulting in an even greater
overall tax benefit. On the other hand, if the tax rate at the time of
withdrawal is higher, a greater amount than the original loan must
be repaid, reducing the overall tax benefit.
The cost to the Treasury of the tax subsidy thus depends on the
amount of contributions, the opportunity cost of the loaned tax dollars
(the Treasury's net borrowing cost), 145 the timing of contributions and

144. For example, assume that A receives $200,000 in 1988 from qualified employer plans,
all of which is attributable to A's accrued benefit as of August 1, 1986. If A is married and
does not itemize, A's income tax, assuming no other income, would be $53,536. Because of the
transitional rule no excise tax would be payable on the $50,000 excess distribution. Without the
transitional rule, the excise tax would be $7,500. If the tax rates had not changed, A's income
tax would have been $78,848.
145. This cost is the interest the Treasury must pay on borrowed funds less the income
tax it collects from the recipients of such interest.
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the rate of earnings on the contributions, as well as the tax bracket
of the individual when contributions, earnings, and withdrawals occur.
The subsidy associated with a given amount of retirement accumulation
can vary considerably depending on the precise operation of these
factors. It is quite possible for the tax subsidy for large retirement
accumulations to be much less than that associated with much smaller
accumulations.
The problem can best be illustrated by considering a few basic
hypotheticals. For simplicity, assume that the Treasury's net borrowing cost is a constant six percent and that the marginal income tax
rate is a constant twenty-eight percent. Assume that A has retired
at age seventy and has accumulated $907,830 in a profit-sharing plan,
which under the Treasury's valuation tables is equivalent to a $150,000
life annuity. Assume further that the $907,830 is the result of annual
contributions of $7,420 over a thirty year period and a plan rate of
return of eight percent. The cost to the Treasury in lost tax revenue
and the interest on that revenue amounts to $484,581146 at the end of
the thirty year period. Of course, some of this cost will be recovered
as distributions occur and taxes are finally paid on the deferred contributions and earnings. If the full $907,830 were distributed at the
end of the thirty-year period, the Treasury would obtain $254,192 in
income taxes (twenty-eight percent of the distribution). The total cost
to the Treasury of the tax subsidy would then be $230,389, in current
dollars. The actual subsidy will vary with the timing and amount of
the actual distributions. To facilitate comparing this hypothetical accumulation with others assume that a single distribution of the retirement accumulation is made.
Now consider B, also age seventy, whose profit-sharing plan has
managed to accumulate $1,210,440, one-third more than A and the
equivalent of a $200,000 life annuity. B's employer contributed $25,279
per year for the last sixteen years and the funds earned a twelve
percent rate of return. In this case the cost of the subsidy can be
calculated to be $135,406.17 The subsidy to B is significantly less than
that provided to A, yet B will pay substantial excise taxes and A will
pay none.
146. This amount was computed using a computer spreadsheet program. It is derived by
sumnning the following amounts for each year: (1) the tax revenue lost each year due to the
failure to tax to the employee the plan contributions and the earnings on the plan accumulations
during the year, and (2) the Treasury's net borrowing cost during the year of the sum of all
the lost revenue and borrowing costs of the previous years.
147. This amount is the difference between $474,329, the accumulated cost to the Treasury
over the 16-year period, and $338,923, the tax on the $1,210,440 (assuming a single distribution
at a 28% tax rate).
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Particularly striking inequities can arise when substantial portions
of the retirement fund earnings are in the form of unrealized appreciation. This might occur, for example, in a plan such as an ESOP that
invests primarily in employer securities and the employer stock is a
growth stock paying little or no dividend. Since the taxation of unrealized appreciation is deferred even when it occurs outside a retirement plan, there is no tax subsidy for such deferral within a plan.
The subsidy is based on the deferred taxes on the contributions alone.
A corollary of this is that the amount of the tax subsidy is independent
of the amount of unrealized appreciation. For example, if B's twelve
percent rate of return were due entirely to unrealized appreciation,
rather than income, such as interest or dividends, that would have
been taxable if held outside the plan, the cost of the subsidy would
be a paltry $68,521.14 But if B's rate of return were an unrealized
thirteen percent, B would have accumulated $1,333,178 and therefore
be liable for even more excise tax. Yet the cost to the Treasury still
remains at $68,521, since it based solely on the contributions.
If the excess retirement accumulation is largely produced by unrealized appreciation, the section 4981A(d) tax will operate particularly
unfairly. Because section 1014 gives a fair market value basis to assets
passing from a decedent, the unrealized appreciation of assets held
by a decedent is never taxed. A qualified plan or IRA may actually
provide the Treasury with more tax revenue than a normal investment
would provide.
For example, assume that B, in the hypothetical above with the
twelve percent annual unrealized appreciation, dies. Had the
$1,210,440 in assets of the plan been held directly by B, they would
have received a stepped-up fair market value basis of $1,210,440. If
B's beneficiaries then sold the assets, there would be no gain and thus
no income tax on the unrealized appreciation. By having the assets
in the plan, the Treasury gains an additional $225,673, which is the
twenty-eight percent tax on the $805,976 of unrealized appreciation.
This exceeds by far the $68,521 subsidy attributable to the tax deferred
on the contributions.
The lack of a consistent relationship between the level of the excise
taxes and actual tax subsidy is a serious weakness of the new taxes.

148. This amount is the difference between $181,771, the accumulated cost to the Treasury
over the 16-year period of deferring the tax on the contributions, and $113,250, the tax on the

$404,464 of accumulated contributions (assuming a single distribution at a 28% tax rate). Note
that the tax on the entire $1,210,440 is not subtracted since the tax on the unrealized appreciation
would have been collected if the assets had been held outside of the plan. Only the tax on the
basis of the assets is additional tax that the Treasury is receiving to offset its prior costs.
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However, as a practical matter no easily administrable method exists
to compute the tax subsidy associated with a given amount of retirement savings. The subsidy depends in part on the factors noted above,
namely the income tax bracket of the employee over all the years of
coverage under the plan and at the time of the distributions from the
plan, the nature of the underlying investment, and the timing of contributions and distributions. The numerical examples described above
involved situations where each of these factors was greatly simplified.
In a realistic example the informational and computational burden
would be enormous.
Even if one could compute the tax subsidy resulting from a given
level of retirement savings, it is by no means clear that the participant
of employer-provided plans actually receives all of the subsidy. To
compute the actual benefits of the plan to a given participant, one
must determine what the participant's compensation would have been
absent the contributions to the retirement plan. For highly paid employees it is entirely possible that compensation is reduced by more
than the amount contributed to the plan. For example, an employee
who was paid $60,000 before the plan's establishment might only demand $53,500 if a $6,000 contribution is made to the plan, because
the tax benefits of having the $6,000 in the plan exceed the extra
$500 salary reduction. In effect, some of the tax benefit flows to the
employer who establishes the plan. However, the employer will very
likely have to transfer some or all of this benefit to those lower-paid
workers covered by the plan who are unwilling to accept even a dollarfor-dollar reduction in wages in return for retirement plan contributions. Thus a worker earning $10,000 might only accept a $500 reduction in wages in return for a $1,000 contribution to the plan. 149 No

analytical method exists to determine how the tax subsidy is ultimately
distributed among the various groups of employees, the employer and
even the customers of the employer, but it almost certainly depends
on the relative number of higher and lower-paid employees, and both
their relative and absolute levels of compensation.
The new taxes take none of this into account. Each focuses on only
one factor, either the amount of distributions in any one year or, in
the case of decedents, the total amount of retirement plan accumulations. Of course, no tax is perfect and in the interest of simplicity
some sacrifice of equity may be warranted. However, there is no
evidence that Congress has even attempted to make a rational trade-off

149. See Wolk, DiscriminationRules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 430-32 (1984).
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between these two goals. Nothing in the legislative history indicates
that Congress chose the fifteen percent tax rate because it recovered
the unwarranted tax benefits flowing to an individual in the typical
or average case. No explanation is provided as to why the President's
proposal of a ten percent rate was increased to fifteen percent or why
either rate is more appropriate than any other.
Apart from their failure to recover the supposedly unwarranted
tax benefits in any coherent fashion, another troublesome problem
with the new taxes exists. By decreasing the tax incentive for contributions to qualified plans on behalf of high income participants, it may
discourage contributions for lower-paid workers as well. The reason
for this lies in the voluntary nature of employer-provided retirement
plans. The present tax subsidy for qualified employer plans is designed
to induce employers to establish and maintain plans covering lower
and moderate-income workers by creating substantial tax benefits for
higher-income employees. 15°
To control the level of the subsidy, Congress relies on a number
of fairly blunt instruments, such as rules preventing discrimination in
favor of highly compensated employees,'61 minimum coverage and participation standards, '5 maximum limits on contributions and benefits,'3
and in some cases even rules requiring certain minimum benefits. 4
The new excise taxes are another tool in this endeavor, but one that
raises the same dilemma as the others. It will reduce the tax subsidy
flowing to the highest paid employees, but it will also thereby potentially discourage the establishment or maintenance of qualified plans.
If the tax subsidy is in fact unnecessarily high, the excise tax will
reduce it with no loss of social benefit. But if the tax subsidy to the
higher bracket employees is already marginal given the cost of covering lower-paid workers, the plan may be terminated or never even
established. 55

Fixing location of the most cost effective level of excise taxation
is a very difficult empirical problem. But it seems clear that this level
must depend on the nature of the participants in the plans which gave

150. Id.; Graetz, supra note 1, at 878-79.
151. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4), (a)(5).
152. See id. § 410.
153. See id. § 415.
154. See id § 416.
155. There is some evidence that the excise taxes, in combination with the increased
minimum benefit requirements and the lower tax rates provided in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
may lead to the termination of some plans. See Taxes May Spur Small Businesses to Kill
Pensions, Wall St. J., June 12, 1987, at 37, col. 3.
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rise to the excess distributions and accumulations. More incentive is
required to establish a plan with proportionately many lower-income
participants. Yet the current excise taxes apply regardless of the
composition of the plans giving rise to the excess benefits. In this
regard the weakness of the new taxes in fine tuning the subsidy
mirrors that of the contribution and benefit maxima. 156 This is not
surprising, because the new taxes were designed to correct operational
deficiencies in these maxima.
The problems with the section 4981A taxes are symptomatic of the
basic problem with the entire system of retirement savings taxation:
the tax system is simply not an appropriate vehicle for carrying out
our national retirement security policy goals. The voluntary nature of
employer and individual retirement savings and the very nature of
the benefits of tax deferral have pushed us to adopt a system that
basically bribes higher-income employees with tax benefits to encourage their employers to set up plans that provide retirement benefits
to lower-paid employees. This is costly and inefficient. If Congress is
concerned that our citizens do not save enough for retirement, a preferable approach would be to make a certain level of retirement savings
mandatory. 15 7 Unfortunately, such a proposal seems unrealistic in
today's political climate of deregulation and less government.m
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new taxes on excess retirement distributions and accumulations are seriously flawed, even assuming the improvements contained
in the Technical Corrections Bill are enacted. Some of these problems
can be solved with little difficulty. Without compromising any of its
basic policy goals, Congress could (1) enact a special apportionment
rule for the section 4981A(d) tax, (2) repeal the complex and unwarranted grandfather rule, (3) modify the treatment of lump sum distributions, and (4) define the term "interest" used in section 4981A(d)
to eliminate ambiguities.
Other problems are not so easily solved. The inappropriate excise
taxation of bunched retirement distributions can be eliminated only
at the cost of a substantial increase in complexity. But even if we

156. See Wolk, supra note 149, at 444-45.
157. The President's Commission on Pension Policy proposed such a system of mandatory
retirement savings, dubbed the Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS), in 1981. See

President's Comm'n on Pension Policy, Coming of Age: Toward a National Retirement Income
Policy 42-46 (1981). For a discussion of the MUPS proposal, see Wolk, supm note 149, at 465-71.

158. See Graetz, supm note 1, at 907-08.
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ignore the bunching problem, the taxes operate in a haphazard fashion.
Individuals who have had enormous benefits from the tax subsidy may
pay little or no excise tax,. while others who have benefited far less
may pay substantial taxes. The taxes may operate particularly unfairly
in those cases where much of the plan's earnings are in the form of
unrealized appreciation. The taxes may in such cases serve more as
a penalty on successful investing rather than as a vehicle for recovering
excessive tax benefits. However, because determining the actual
amount of tax subsidy flowing to a given individual is impractical, and
in the case of employer provided plans probably impossible, this flaw
is an inevitable part of the taxes.
Finally, there is the general dilemma Congress faces when it tries
to control the tax subsidy associated with employer provided plans.
Because Congress relies on the subsidy to higher-paid employees to
encourage the creation of plans which cover lower and medium paid
employees, any reduction of the subsidy may incrementally discourage
the establishment or continuation of such plans. However, because
the definition of "excessive" is relatively high and therefore the taxes
probably affect only a small number of individuals, a dramatic effect
on plans is unlikely.
In this era of dramatically lower tax rates for higher-income taxpayers and enormous federal deficits, a tax that affects only those
individuals who accumulate tax-favored retirement savings sufficient
to provide them with more than $150,000 a year for life may seem
appropriate even if it has some flaws. Also, to the extent the taxes
impose significant planning burdens, they are probably borne by those
capable of paying for them. Yet the expected revenue from the taxes
over the next few years is less than $5 million. 159 One wonders whether
society's resources could be better spent in a fashion other than planning to minimize these taxes and administering their collection.

159.

CONFERENCE REPORT,

supra

note 29, at 11-877. This relatively low amount is pro-

bably due to the rather generous grandfather rule.
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